

CHAPTER II FRAMEWORK OF THE THEORIES

In this term paper, I will be using a couple of inter-disciplinary theories, which are philosophy about morality, and discourse analysis (linguistics) that deal with speech acts. Based on these theories I will analyze the issue of morality that is depicted in the Arthur's utterances from Joker movie 2019.

Out of linguistics discipline emerges three kinds of study, first literary criticism, second semiotics, and the last is discourse analysis. All of these studies focus on looking out the implied meaning behind the text. Discourse analysis itself is a method to unravel the meaning behind the text that the speaker tries to implicitly convey. In this context, I will use discourse analysis to get the implied meaning within the movie discourse. The method that I use does not depict reality, but rather create reality by looking at the words that affect the reader.

2.1 Searle's Speech Acts Theory

Speech acts are theory made by language philosopher J.L Austin. John Searle, inspired from Austin makes his own theory which still correlates with the original theory. Speech act itself is a theory about the implicit meaning of utterance; an utterance that the speaker makes to achieve an intended meaning.

Speech acts itself consist of three categories, which are *Locutionary Act*, *Illocutionary Act*, and *Perlocutionary acts*. To choose which way the speech to be interpreted, one must first choose the type of speech acts which was performed. Locutionary act, according to Searle in his book "*Expression and Meaning*" is merely an act of producing structurally grammatical sentence and linguistics sound with certain references. So to say, the locutionary act is just a case as illocutionary and perlocutionary act is occurring simultaneously with the locutionary act.

In attempting to express one's thoughts, one does not only produce utterances containing grammatical structure and words, one is also performing actions via those utterances (Yule, 1996, p.47). If one works in a certain situation where the boss has a lot more power than oneself, then the boss's utterance of expression is more than merely an utterance. For example: "You are fired!" (Yule, 1996, p.48).

According to Searle (1979), speech acts are done based on the mind. Searle argues that intentionality is an important part of one who is uttering speech. Language has several ways to be used by the speaker, one of them is an indirect speech act. Indirect speech act has a hidden motive in a way that the hearer wouldn't understand if it only interprets superficially. Furthermore, a sentence, which has an infinite number of combinations, will not be identical to one or another.

There is an example of meaning which is those in which the speaker utters a sentence and means exactly and literally what he says. In such case, the speaker wants to make likely an illocutionary effect in the hearer, and he intends to make this effect by getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce it, and he/she intends to get the hearer to recognize this intention in virtue of the speaker's knowledge of the rules that govern the utterance of the sentence (Searle, 1979). But, not all cases of implicit meaning are this simple: insinuations, irony, and metaphor. to mention a few examples - the speaker's utterance meaning and the sentence meaning come in various ways. One important class of such cases is that in which the speaker utters a sentence, means what he says, but also means something more than what it is said.

For example, the speaker might utter a sentence "I want him to do it" by way of requesting the third person to do something. The utterance is meant as a statement, but it is also meant certainly as a request, the

request made by way of making a statement. In this case, a sentence that has the illocutionary force indicators (IFID) for this kind of illocutionary act can be uttered to perform, furthermore, another type of illocutionary act. There are also cases in which the speaker might utter a sentence and mean literally just like what he says and also mean another illocutionary act with a distinct propositional content. For example, the speaker might utter the sentence "Can you reach the salt?" and mean it not merely as a question but as a request to get the salt for the speaker.

Actions which we meant to be uttered are mostly called speech acts. In English language these types of utterances are usually given certain labels, like compliment, apology, complaint, promise, invitation, or request. These varying terms which are for different types of speech acts do apply to the speaker's intention in uttering an utterance. The speaker normally expects that his or her intention will be acknowledged by the hearer. Both speaker and hearer are usually more aware of this process by the circumstances that has context with the utterance. This circumstance including other utterances are called *Speech Event*. In a lot of ways, it is nature that speech event could affect the interpretation of an utterance (Searle, 1979, p.7).

In attempting to explain the illocutionary acts in this analysis, I categorized the illocutionary acts into several different types, which are: (Assertives) is when we try to tell other people how the things should be (Directives) is how we try to make them to do certain things which we intended them to do so, (Commissives) is how we would do something in which we are promising to them (Expressives) is how we will express our subjective feeling to other people, and (Declarations) is how we change the world as what we have meant in our mind via our utterance.

2.1.1 Assertives

The main point or purpose of assertive category is to do the speaker (in several degrees) to something which is the main

problem, to the truth of of which the uttered proposition(Searle, 1979, p.8). being performed. All of the parts of the assertive category can be assessed on the dimension of assessment which is in this case include to the true or false. Once we have recognized the existence of assertives as quite different category, based on the notion of illocutionary point, then the existence of a large number of performative verbs that denote illocutions which can be assessed in the true or false dimension and yet are not solely statements will be easily explained in terms of the fact that they have some features of illocutionary force which are in addition to illocutionary point. Thus, for example, consider: "boasting" and "complaining". They both denote assertives with the feature that they would have something to do with the topic of the speaker. "concluding" and "deducing" are also categorized as assertives with the feature that they have marked with certain relations between the assertive illocution and the rest of the text or the context of the utterance. The simplest test of an assertive is this: can you literally characterize it (inter alia) as true or false. Though I hasten to add that this will give neither necessary nor sufficient conditions, as we shall see when we get to my fifth class. (Searle, 1979, p.13). These are the words categorized into assertives illocutionary act: Asserting, claiming, affirming, stating, denying, disclaiming, assuring, arguing, informing, notifying, reminding, objecting, predicting, reporting, suggesting, insisting, guessing, swearing admitting, confessing, accusing, blaming, lamenting.

2.1.3 Directives

The illocutionary point of these consists in the fact that they are attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something. They may be very modest "attempts" as when I invite you to do it or suggest that you do it, or they may be very fierce attempts as when I insist that you do it (Searle, 1979, p.13). The direction of fit is world-to-words and the sincerity condition is want (or wish or desire). Verbs denoting members of this class are ask, order,

command, request, beg, plead, pray, entreat, and also invite, permit, and advise. I think also that it is clear that dare, defy and challenge which Austin lists as performatives are in this class. Many of Austin's performatives are also in this class (Searle, 1979, p.14). Here are some of keywords for directive illocutionary acts: directing, requesting, asking, urging, telling, requiring, demanding, commanding, ordering, forbidding, enjoining, permitting, suggesting, insisting, warning, advising, recommending, begging, supplicating, imploring, and praying.

2.1.4 Commissives

Searle's *Declarative* illocutionary act is similarly defined as what Austin has defined. Commissives then are those illocutionary acts whose point is to commit the speaker (again in varying degrees) to some future course of action. The direction of fit is world-to-word and the sincerity condition is intention (Searle, 1979, p.14). Some of the examples are: committing, promising, threatening, vowing, swearing, accepting, consenting, refusing, offering, bidding, assuring, warranting, contracting, and betting.

2.1.5 Expressives

A fourth category I shall call, Expressives, The illocutionary point of this class is to express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content. The paradigms of expressive verbs are thank, congratulate, apologize, condole, deplore, and welcome. Notice that in expressives there is no direction of fit. In performing an expressive, the speaker is neither trying to get the world to match the words nor the words to match the world, rather the truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed. Thus, for example, when I apologize for having stepped on your toe, it is not my purpose either to claim that your toe was stepped on nor to get it stepped on. This fact is neatly reflected in the syntax (of English) by the fact that the

paradigm expressive verbs in their performative occurrence will not take that clauses but require a gerundive nominalization transformation (or some other nominal). One cannot say: I apologize that I stepped on your toe; rather the correct English is, I apologize for stepping on your toe. Similarly, one cannot have: I congratulate you that you won the race nor I thank you that you paid me the money. One must have: I congratulate you on winning the race (congratulations on winning the race) I thank you for paying me the money (thanks for paying me the money). These syntactical facts, I suggest, are consequences of the fact that there is no direction of fit in expressives. The truth of the proposition expressed in an expressive is presupposed (Searle, 1979, p.14).

2.1.6 Declarations

According to Searle (1979) there is still left an important class of cases, where the state of affairs represented in the proposition expressed is realized or brought into existence by the illocutionary force indicating device, cases where one brings a state of affairs into existence by declaring it to exist, cases where, so to speak, "saying makes it so". Examples of these cases are "I resign", "You're fired", "I excommunicate you", "I christen this ship the battleship Missouri", "I appoint you chairman", and "War is hereby declared". These cases were presented as paradigms in the very earliest discussions of performatives, but it seems to me they are still not adequately described in the literature and their relation to other kinds of illocutionary acts is usually misunderstood. Let us call this class, Declarations. It is the defining characteristic of this class that the successful performance of one of its members brings about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality, successful performance guarantees that the propositional content corresponds to the world: if I successfully perform the act of appointing you chairman, then you are chairman; if I successfully perform the act of nominating you as candidate, then you are a

candidate; if I successfully perform the act of declaring a state of war, then war is on; if I successfully perform the act of marrying you, then you are married. The surface syntactical structure of many sentences used to perform declarations conceals this point from us because in them there is no surface syntactical distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force. Thus, "You're fired" and "I resign" do not seem to permit a distinction between illocutionary force and propositional content, but I think in fact that in their use to perform declarations their semantic structure is: I declare: your employment is (hereby) terminated I declare: my position is (hereby) terminated. Declarations bring about some alteration in the status or condition of the referred to object or objects solely in virtue of the fact that the declaration has been successfully performed. This feature of declarations distinguishes them from the other categories. In the history of the discussion of these topics since Austin's first introduction of his distinction between performatives and constatives, this feature of declarations has not been properly understood. The original distinction between constatives and performatives was supposed to be a distinction between utterances which are sayings (constatives, statements, assertions, etc.) and utterances which are doings (promises, bets, warnings, etc.). What I am calling declarations were included in the class of performatives. The main theme of Austin's mature work, *How to Do Things with Words* is that this distinction collapses. Just as saying certain things constitutes getting married (a performative) and saying certain things constitutes making a promise (another performative), so saying certain things constitutes making a statement (supposedly a "constative"). As Austin saw but as many philosophers still fail to see, the parallel is exact. Making a statement is as much performing an illocutionary act as making a promise, a bet, a warning or what have you. Any utterance will consist in performing one or more illocutionary acts (Searle, 1979, p.14).

Without acts, speech acts could not be called speech acts. This means acts should be present in condition after one uttered an utterance. Acts are not solely based on one intention, acts also required one morality judgement which reckon one's morality. It is to say that to judge one's morality, it is important to see one's acts. Speech acts, I believe, correlate with Freidrich Nietzsche's moral theory, because Nietzsche define quite similar topic about 'promise' which Nietzsche believes as an act which human being unable to take control over. On the other hand, Searle categorized 'promise' as commissives speech acts.

2.2 Nietzsche's Moral Theory

Morality, according Gavronsky (2012) is the very foundation for an act. Acts would not be possible if one has no moral value. Morality is necessary to provide oneself a reason to act in certain way towards other people. For example, it is morally correct to rescue homeless puppies, it is rational things to do for sure. But an act to save puppies wouldn't be possible if one does an act without morality. Same thing goes with *Speech Acts*, speech acts does require an intention to occur. This intention is what connect one's morality with one's speech. Because speech acts require intention, the intention would require morality to be a reason to act. Freidrich Nietzsche is very well known philosopher for his profound proponent of nihilism. Nietzsche has his own point of view on morality. His view in morality is what we call anti-realist. It means that Nietzsche does not belief in any moral value. Moral value for Nietzsche is a form of repression of one's own will. It means that our morality is like a veil that hides our potential to flourish into what he is called *Urbemensch* (or "Overman" in English). Nietzsche provides an idea about life transformation which also assess one's morality. It will be more easy to judge one's morality if stages of life transformation is applied. The transformation of life could give a clear reflection of one's moral state.

What is life? For Nietzsche it's that which overcomes itself. It eats itself and births itself, getting more powerful with each iteration. "Man came from ape, but what comes after man?" Nietzsche says in his book "Thus Spoke Zarathustra". That of which comes after man is the Overman. The overman is the next evolution of life and it will be more powerful than anything we have ever seen. None of us can be the overman, but we can be the catalyst for it. We can become the fruit that carries the seeds of a sweeter future, the fertile soil from which the grandest tree grows, and the clouds out of which the lightning comes (Nietzsche, 2006, p.7). But, before we can give birth to the overman, we must first become free spirit, we have to become fertile soil. In this second chapter, I will explain Nietzsche theory about three stages that the spirit must go through to become free.

When the spirit comes into being, it's confronted by the great, golden dragon. The dragon is beauty and terror, awe and fear, protector and destroyer. It's decorated with thousands of glittering scales, and on every scale, all of the things that you must do are written. The dragon says that "the value of all things, and all things of value, have already been written on my scales." The spirit is filled with awe and respect for the dragon, but in realizing the greatness of the dragon, it realizes its own inadequacies. The spirit wishes to serve the dragon and learn everything that it must do, so that it may take part in its greatness (Nietzsche, 2006, p.16)

2.2.1 The Camel

The first transformation takes place, and the spirit becomes a camel. The camel is a preserver: it studies, absorbs and upholds the values of the dragon (Nietzsche, 2006, p.16). It maintains order in the realm by bearing the burdens of others. It takes pride in its ability to bear burdens and it should. In many ways, this is an act of heroism. The camel bears the burden of others and, in doing so, lightens their load. But eventually, the camel realizes that not all things should be preserved, and some burdens are too

much to bear. It realizes that it's become a slave to the will and values of another. The camel is merely a tool. The dragon which once allowed life to survive and thrive is now the thing that holds it back. The camel yearns for freedom, and so the spirit must transform again.

2.2.2 The Lion

The camel, a beast of burden, becomes the lion. The lion is destroyer. It confronts the dragon, and for every "you shall", it says "no". To every "you must not", it says "I will". According to Nietzsche (2006) the lion stands against tradition and the status quo. It starts to see certain traditions as unworthy of being preserved. Instead of serving the dragon, the lion battles it for freedom. In this moment, the spirit must learn to destroy thing that it once respected the most. This is difficult because overcoming the dragon means that the lion has to overcome a part of itself. But this isn't the end. Like camel, the lion is a reaction. The spirit is still tied to and dependent on the dragon. But, this battle for freedom, the courage to say no, opens up a new space of possibility: if destruction is possible, so is creation. If we can fall, then we can rise.

2.2.3 The Child

A third transformation must take place: the lion must become the child. The child is a creator (Nietzsche, 2006, p.66). Creation is redemption. All of the mistakes of the past, including our own, can be redeemed if something better can be made from them. The child must learn to forget the past and not hold resentment to those who came before. Those who came before did, after all, fertilize the soil out of which they grew. Every form of life, preying on each other and giving birth to one another, led to the birth of overman. Can overman redeem all of their pain and suffering?. Can overman's life be used to create something that benefits all of life?. The child is a new beginning. It lives own value and its own will. It has the potential to redeem the past and give birth to a brighter future. The camel, the lion and the child: these are the three stages that Arthur must traverse to become overman , but most people never even become a camel. The story

of the three stages is the story of self-overcoming; it's the story of the one who become tradition before overcoming it. The one who can overcome themselves become more powerful, and through creation, they can make all of life more powerful. They can redeem our sufferings. Nietzsche believe that to become free spirit, we have to overcome ourself.

2.2.4 Slave and Master Morality

The beginning of the slaves' revolt in morality occurs when resentment itself turns creative and gives birth to values: the resentment of those beings who, denied the proper response of action, compensate for it only with imaginary revenge. Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying 'yes' to itself, slave morality says 'no' on principle to everything that is 'outside', 'other', 'non-self': and this 'no' is its creative deed. According to Nietzsche (2006) this reversal of the evaluating glance this essential orientation to the outside instead of back onto itself is a feature of resentment: in order to come about, slave morality first has to have an opposing, external world, it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all, its action is basically a reaction.

Exactly the opposite is true of the noble one who conceives of the basic idea 'good' by himself, in advance and spontaneously, and only then creates a notion of 'bad'! This 'bad' of noble origin and that 'evil' from the cauldron of unassuaged hatred – the first is an afterthought, an aside, a complementary colour, whilst the other is the original, the beginning, the actual deed in the conception of slave morality – how different are the two words 'bad' and 'evil', although both seem to be the opposite for the same concept, 'good'. But, it is not the same concept 'good'; on the contrary, one should ask who is actually evil in the sense of the morality of resentment (Nietzsche, 2006, p.22). The stern reply is: precisely the 'good' person of the other morality, the noble, powerful, dominating one, but re-touched, re-interpreted and reviewed through the poisonous eye of resentment. The Masters are strong, imaginative, well off, and powerful. They can do

whatever they like. They love themselves and consider themselves to be acceptable. They name the contrary energies of themselves, the powerless and weak, as terrible. Being terrible is exactly how an individual is, they didn't decide to be that way; they're simply washouts.

The Slaves are less wealthy. Abused by the Masters, they can't do what they like. They are frail, poor, and angry. They at first view themselves as terrible, as the Masters do, on the grounds that they come up short on the ideas to do something else.

2.3 Literature Review

I use literature review consisting of primary and secondary source. The primary source I use is a movie entitled "*Joker*" by Todd Phillips.

The first secondary sources I use is a book entitled "*Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*" by John Searle. This book consists of methods to analyze types of speech acts.

The second secondary sources I use is a book entitled "*Expression and Meaning*" by John Searle. This book consists of methods, theories, and example of cases in the linguistics field.

The third secondary sources I use is a book entitled "*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*" by Freidrich Nietzsche. This book consists of Nietzsche's concepts about morality which can help to analyze this movie.